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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this note is to clarify how the idea of "causal depth" can play a role in 
finding the more "approximately true" explanation through causal comparisons. It is 
not an exhaustive treatment but rather focuses on a few aspects that may be the most 
critical in evaluating the explanatory strengths of a theory in the social sciences. It 
presents a general argument which is anti-Humean on the critical side and scientific 
realist on the positive side. It also elucidates how explanations in political economy 
and other social sciences can be judged by the scientific realist criterion of causal 
depth by an extensive example from research in the political economy of 
development. In this case, an "intentional" and methodologically individualist 
neoclassical explanation is contrasted with a "structural" dual-dual approach as rival 
theories purporting to explain the same set of phenomena.  
 
Keywords: Social Explanation, Causal Depth, Scientific Realism, Political Economy, 
Neoclassical Economics, Structuralism, Social Science Theories, Economic Models 
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1. Introduction: Causal Depth contra Humean Empiricism 
 
One of David Hume's great insights was to recognize that while events were 
observable; their putative underlying "causes" were not observable. What were 
observable such as spatial contiguity, temporal succession etc. turned out in his 
analysis not to be causes at all but the prejudices of our thinking? The incisiveness of 
Hume's empiricist analysis which found that there was no causality beyond the 
empirical regularities observed led Kant to declare that it was Hume who awakened 
him from his "dogmatic slumber". 
 
 Kant's awakening produced the classic "Critique of Pure Reason" where Kant 
attempted to rescue causality by arguing that by his transcendental deductions 
causality along with universality, necessity etc. needed to be conceptualized as 
"categories of our mind". In the twentieth century, the logical positivists rejected the 
Kantian solution and embraced the Humean position albeit with typical flourishes of 
symbolic logic that was developing at an accelerated pace in the 1920s. Thus logical 
positivists such as Hempel or Carnap eschew causal language wherever possible. If 
cause is mentioned at all, it is to be understood as part of an empirical law or law-like 
statement. Hempel's deductive nomological model is the most rigorous and elegant 
example of this practice. 
 
In contrast to the empiricist tradition, the scientific realists have always--- although 
not always equally clearly or forcefully--- emphasized causal explanations. In the 19th 
century, Darwin himself was an exponent of this view as a close study of his 1836-
1844 notebooks reveal. Huxley was, as usual, much more forthright and pugnacious 
than Darwin. For example in Huxley (1894:Vol.1;158-9), one reads: 
 
any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit, that its progress has, in all 
ages meant, and now, more than ever, means, the extension of the province of what we call 
matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of thought of 
what we call spirit and spontaneity. 
 
Likewise, George Romanes, another 19th century realist and a friend of both Darwin 
and Huxley, writes of  Darwinism that it 
 
seeks to bring the phenomena of organic nature into line with those of inorganic; and therefore to 
show that whatever view we may severally take as to the kind of causation which is energizing in 
the latter we must now extend to the former. . . .the theory of evolution by natural selection . . 
.endeavours to comprise all the facts of adaptation in organic nature under the same category of 
explanation as those which occur in inorganic nature – that is to say, under the category of physical, 
or ascertainable, causation. (Romanes, 1893:402) 
  
What is significant in all these is that Darwin, as Dennet (1995) has most clearly 
pointed out, more than any other scientist before him articulates and exemplifies a 
causal approach to scientific explanation by appealing to both non-observable and 
deep underlying causal processes. It is probably more helpful to study Darwin's 
notebooks than even the most articulate realist philosopher of science to see how a 
search for deep, non-mystical explanation can proceed in a complex, almost uncharted 
territory.1 In this, there is a lot for social scientists to learn. 
                                               
1
 See Barrett et. als eds.(1987), Darwin(1859,1871,1883), Dewey(1910) Hodgson(2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, Knudsen (2004), Mayr (1964,1988,1992) 
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However, even if we grant that the notion of cause is not problematic---it actually is 
still controversial among the philosophers (See Sosa and Tooley (1993) and Salmon 
(1998)) although specification of causal mechanisms in terms of non-observable 
entities whose causal effects are in principle observable will be accepted by most 
scientists as a practical way to proceed2--- the question of how to choose from among 
a list of alternative causes still remains.  
 
The purpose of this note is to clarify how the idea of "causal depth" can play a role in 
this endeavor. I will not try to be exhaustive but will rather focus on a few aspects that 
may be the most critical in evaluating the explanatory strengths of a theory. I will 
present an example from research in development economics where an "intentional" 
neoclassical explanation is contrasted with a "structural" dual-dual approach to the 
same set of phenomena.  
 
Although the present approach is, at least in part, intended to draw attention to the 
revolutionary contributions of Darwin both to science and the philosophy of science, 
it is compatible with the contemporary developments including Boyd's ( and 
Harman's) abductive defense of scientific realism  as inference to the best explanation 
and Bhaskar's critical realism.3 However, in contrast with both and consonant with 
Miller (1987), I focus attention on the need for drawing out the principles of the 
relevant realist philosophy of science from within the "topic-specific" practices of 
particular sciences. The purpose of this essay is not to establish this proposition 
deductively but rather to illustrate its plausibility by pinpointing the philosophical 
principles embodied in actual pieces of scientific work in a specific problem area. 
 
2. A (Partial) Characterization of Causal Depth and Some Exemplars 
 
The essential idea of causal depth4 as a selection criterion for explanations is that 
among the rival theoretical explanations for a given phenomenon, the deepest 
explanation---deepest compared to its rivals at the time--- is to be chosen 
provisionally as the "best"(" approximately true") explanation. As Miller (1987:88) 
puts it: 
 
Suppose a list of causes fits an appropriate standard causal pattern and accurately describes factors 
sufficient under the circumstances to bring about the effect in question. It may still fail to explain 
because those causes lack sufficient depth. Roughly speaking, a cause is too shallow to explain why 
something occurred if it is just one of the ways in which another cause, as intimately connected with 
the effect, produced the latter. In the slogan version of the causal theory of explanation, such causes 
are excluded by the requirement that "underlying" causes be described. Actually, "not underlain" 
would be the more accurate, but absolutely ugly term, since the question is whether one cause is 
undermined by another. 
                                               
2
 There are some worries in physics about quantum causality and particularly non-locality after Bell's 
inequality was used by Aspect to show that non-locality did exist at the sub-atomic level. However, 
given the existence of "decoherence" at a larger scale level of our world, this may not be such a 
problem. For the social world there still remains the problem of mind-body identity vs. panpsychism 
and the role of consciousness and meaning that phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches 
emphasize. However, I believe that at the present state of our knowledge such issues are not resolvable, 
and we should be open-minded about alternative modes of explanations in the social sciences. Here, 
clearly the attention is restricted to the set of causal explanations that can be compared meaningfully. 
3
 See Boyd(1973,1992),Harman(1965),Bhaskar(1975), Lawson(1997) 
4
 See also Wilson(1994) and Wendt(1998,1999,2000,2001) 
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More specifically, a cause, X, helping to bring about Y, is too shallow to explain why Y occurred if 
a cause, Z, of Y undermines X in one of two ways: (a) If X had not occurred, Y would have 
happened anyway; Z would have produced some causal substitute for X, bringing Y about in some 
other way. I will label the depth that X lacks, and Z may have here, "depth as necessity." (b) Z is a 
condition in which Y arose that caused Y, and caused it, in part, by causing X; Z is causally prior to 
X yet, also, too intimately related to Y to be bracketed as a remote cause. I will refer to this aspect or 
depth using the label "depth as priority." 
 
In both depth as necessity and depth as priority the Darwinian example insists on a 
trans-empirical and scientific realist theoretical approach. Such an approach pays 
close attention to both contemporaneous and historical data but at the same time 
attempts to imagine in a creative manner various causal connections based on non-
observable theoretical entities. 
 
 In the Humean or logical positivist way of explaining, the dogma is to stick with the 
"facts” or ---to use a somewhat refined philosophical language--- sense-data. 
However, as Quine, Putnam and many others have pointed out the Humean rejection 
of "metaphysics" is itself dogmatic and close-minded since it fails to acknowledge its 
own ontological commitments. 
 
 In some formulations, the Humean "refusal" of ontology can indeed become self-
refuting in the same way that relativism is self-refuting. A causal approach as Darwin 
in particular uses it will sift through a number of rivals to settle upon the most 
plausible---one could loosely use the language of verifications here as well--- 
alternative in light of the data. Darwin's own example involving bats is particularly 
elegant. 
 
I have carefully searched the oldest voyages, but have not finished my search; as yet, I have not 
found a single instance, free from doubt, of a terrestrial mammal (excluding domesticated animals 
kept by the natives) inhabiting an island situated above 300 miles from a continent or great 
continental island; and many islands situated at a much less distance are equally barren. . . . 
Though terrestrial mammals do not occur on oceanic islands, aerial mammals do occur on almost 
every island. New Zealand possesses two bats found nowhere else in the world: Norfolk Island, the 
Viti Archipelago, the Bonin Islands, the Caroline and Marianne Archipelagoes, and Mauritius, all 
possess their peculiar bats. Why, it may be asked, has the supposed creative force produced bats 
but no other mammals on remote islands? On my view this question can be easily answered: for no 
terrestrial mammal can be transported across a wide space of sea, but bats can fly across. [More 
specifically, bat transport occurs to provide a basis for speciation through natural selection, but 
occurs so infrequently that variants on remote islands are not overwhelmed by migrants from the 
more competitive mainland.]5 
 
It is important to emphasize here that Darwin is engaging in a particularly significant 
type of causal comparison in this example. As Miller points out: 
 
Here as throughout the book, Darwin is comparing his favored hypothesis of speciation 
through natural selection not with the mere supposition of its falsehood but with rival 
hypotheses about the factors at work in the phenomena. The existence of islands with terrain 
hospitable to terrestrial mammals lacking such endemic species is important because the 
main rival is the hypothesis, dominant among the best-informed secular-minded scientists of 
the time, that species are created, without ancestors, by a force that makes them well-
adapted to their environments. Also, Darwin makes his argument on the basis of principles 
he shares with the other side, for example, the shared principle that offspring are like their 
parents but subject to small variations, not the tendentiously anti-creationist, though 
plausible principle that a complex organism must be the offspring of another. Finally, Darwin is 
                                               
5
 Quoted from The Origin of Species in Miller(1987) p. 164; See also Darwin(1871,1883) 
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not claiming to have a complete explanation of the phenomena in question, although he certainly 
thinks that the complete answer would entail the approximate truth of his natural-selection 
hypothesis. Elsewhere, he makes it clear both that the mechanisms of heredity and variation are 
mysterious to him and that there is no way of predicting how an observed advantage will affect 
the actual course of speciation. The issue for him is whether the best available account of the 
data, however vague or incomplete, entails the superiority of the natural selection hypothesis 
over its current rivals.6 
 
   This type of argumentation is also common in physics when the contest among rival 
theories demands causally explicit comparisons. An example is Newton's contrast of 
the causal mechanisms in his celestial mechanics with rival accounts such as 
Cartesian vortex theories and Tycho Brahe's system. 
 
 His discussion of comets in his summary pamphlet, " The System of the World", 
makes this clear. Indeed, comets are most appropriate for the purpose of causal 
comparison in this context. All the rival theories in this example share the principles 
of geometric optics. By using these non-controversial shared principles Newton could 
derive important features of the orbits of comets.  
 
Once these orbits are derived mathematically, it then can be argued that the Ptolemaic 
celestial spheres found in Brahe's descriptive geocentric theory can not really exist. 
For if they did, then surely comets would collide against them. Likewise, the 
Cartesian vortices can not be the agents that move the planets and other celestial 
bodies. Newton observes that comets follow a dynamic trajectory through all parts of 
the sky which is inconsistent with the dynamics resulting from a vortex. 
 
One could easily multiply such examples from the mature sciences. I hope the above 
examples demonstrate the need for taking rival theories seriously and for establishing 
alternative causal mechanisms which can be examined by using techniques of 
observation and logical procedures which are accepted as fair by all sides. It should 
also be noted that this is not simply a plea for mainstream theorists to take seriously 
the causal mechanisms postulated by the non-mainstream theories. The argument is 
symmetric. In fact, there are grounds for stressing that the challengers to the 
mainstream theories need to spell out the causal mechanisms of both their own 
alternative theories and the rival mainstream theories as well as the shared principles 
among these alternatives.  Much dogmatism in social sciences can be avoided if rival 
theorists were to make explicit the causal mechanisms and the grounds for what 
would comprise a fair causal comparison among rival theories.  
 
It needs to be emphasized that even after clarifying shared principles, there will 
generally be substantive areas of disagreement among contending theories. However, 
in this instance at least, the discussion of substantive disagreements and their possible 
resolution can proceed without talking at cross-purposes. There are more difficult 
cases where the framework principles themselves are in dispute. For such cases, it is 
necessary to develop a detailed theory of confirmation that would rely on topic-
specific rules within a field or sub-field of inquiry rather than some global a priori or 
deductivist general rule ( for example, the failed logical positivist attempt to offer 
such global rules of confirmation for all sciences).  
 
                                               
6
 Miller (1987) pp.164-65. 
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While such a theory of confirmation for economics, political economy or the social 
sciences in general is yet to be fully developed, the approach defended here would 
call for a consideration of specific debates in substantive areas in order to develop 
such specific principles of confirmation. In particular, the demands for causal depth in 
specific theories would have to play a critical role in developing these topic-specific 
principles. 
 
I now turn from the biological and physical sciences to a topic-specific example in 
political economy of development. In recent years the neoclassical optimizing agent 
approach to institutions has gained prominence. The claim by its proponents (see Ray 
1997, for a particularly lucid and rigorous presentation of the strongest version of the 
neoclassical approach) is that these intentional explanations involving the decision 
making problem of the representative agent are to be preferred to more structural 
models which do not seem to have "microfoundations". The mathematics of 
optimization gives it additional credibility. Yet, what are the claims of the more 
structural "dualistic" models of development inspired by classical political economy? 
 
The most advanced and therefore the most appropriate candidate for causal 
comparison with the neoclassical model is what can be called a “dual-dual” model 
(Svejnar and Thorbecke 1980, 1982, Khan 1982a, b, 1985, 1994, 1997, 2004a, b, 
2006; Khan and Thorbecke 1988, 1989; Thorbecke, 1992, 1994; Thorbecke and 
Santiago, 1984; Thorbecke and Morrisson. 1989). This corresponds to the 
characteristics of a developing economy with not only the traditional and modern 
sectors but also a kind of dualism within each of these sectors in terms of 
formal/informal dichotomy. More specifically, the process of development for 
economies moving from the least developed status to a higher level of development 
may modify the traditional sector further in the direction of a more market-based 
modern sector while the formal/informal dichotomy is accentuated within both the 
sectors.  This is one of the most important moves theoretically which is consistent 
with the stylized facts to be explained in the course of economic development without 
introducing ad hoc assumptions. In fact, the dual-dual theory reveals that even within 
the category of the least developed economies the theoretical possibility of the uneven 
development of the formal and informal sectors both in the urban and the rural areas 
can exist. In recent years, it has indeed been empirically confirmed as well. 
 
Thus, in this theoretical framework, the coexistence and distribution of modern and 
informal type of activities in both rural and urban areas are taken as basic structural 
features of the economy in question. The structural dual-dual approach integrates 
poverty analysis with rural-urban movements in an economy wide setting by 
endogenizing both migration7 and intra-group income distributions and the nominal 
poverty line. Following this line of work leads to the social scientists' being able to 
assess policy repercussions on both poverty specific to particular socioeconomic 
groups and on overall national poverty. 
 
To elaborate a bit further, the starting point is the dual economy models of Lewis 
(1954) and Fei and Ranis (1964)8.The roots of Lewis' seminal work are in the 
                                               
7
 Within an overall trend towards rapid urbanization there can be migration in both directions. This can 
have important implications for poverty reduction policies, as Khan (2006) shows for South Asia. 
8
 See Khan (1997) chs. 2 and 3 for a historical survey and a specific intertemporal dualistic model 
which is used to analyze the conflict between employment and output. 
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classical political economy. These pioneering efforts, however, could not or did not 
take into account the co-presence of dualism within each sector of the two sector 
models of the dual economy. Erik Thorbecke first raised this issue in 1979 during the 
course of a National Science Foundation interdisciplinary project on technology and 
development and Svejnar and Thorbecke (1980, 1982) was the first published work 
on a prototype of dual-dual technology classification scheme. Khan (1982a, b) and 
Khan (1985) were applications of this scheme to the energy and textiles sectors in 
South Korea. Khan (1983) raised the issue of linking technological dualism to poverty 
theoretically, following an early observation of Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976). Khan and 
Thorbecke (1988, 1989) were further applications of technological dualism to 
Indonesia. Khan (1999) explores the connections between rural-urban dualism and 
migration and poverty in South Africa. Khan (2006) explores both rural-urban and 
reverse migration in a dual-dual model for South Asia.  
 
In the current formulation, a rural/urban dichotomy is combined with 
traditional/modern technological dualism, leading to a fourfold classificatory scheme.9 
The four broadly defined sectors in this scheme are: 
 
1. Subsistence agriculture with traditional labor-intensive technologies, 
family farms and food crops for domestic consumption; 
2. Large-scale agriculture producing mostly export crops using capital-
intensive technology. 
3. Urban informal sector defined in an operational manner; 
4. Modern sector with industry and services in the urban areas. 
 
Poverty analysis in this dual-dual approach can be integrated with migration and 
various shocks that are important features of the urbanization process in developing 
countries. Thus, in addition to explaining the standard "development scenario", the 
dual-dual model explains additional features of development--- particularly the 
uneven nature of this process in a number of dimensions--- which the neoclassical 
approach can not. The fact is that while individual agents may or may not optimize, 
the causally deeper political economy approach can explain a number of observable 
phenomena that the neoclassical theory can not explain and this is in addition to 
explaining the same range of phenomena. Furthermore, in the neoclassical version, 
the observable market segmentation, surplus labor etching developing economies are 
derived from the optimizing agent setting only by introducing ad hoc assumptions 
about information, implicit prices, discount rates etc In formal treatments, the 
equations of the model as in Khan (2006; 2008) show that the so-called micro-
foundations at the household and firm levels can also be incorporated in the 
formalization of this theory. In addition, the formal/informal and rural/urban structural 
features are also modeled appropriately. 
. 
An important general lesson about causal depth can also be drawn from this example. 
If scientific realism is even approximately true then pinpointing the ontologically real 
features in an approximate fashion will likely lead to further discoveries. The history 
of the mature sciences corroborates this view. It turns out that in social sciences, too, 
causally deeper theories can lead to deeper insights as well as further discoveries. This 
                                               
9
 See Svejnar-Thorbecke (1980, 1982) and Khan (1983) for early developments. See also Khan (1997, 
2006) and Stifel-Thorbecke (2003). 
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is another reason to reject the Humean straitjacket. But more importantly, it is also a 
good reason to reject dogmatic, a prioristic formulas for doing science even when 
they carry the attractive label of scientific realism, as they sometimes do. The moral is 
to follow what creative scientists do in any field but to do it with an awareness of the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of rival theories. 
 
3. Conclusions: 
 
In this short note I have tried to defend a partial but useful characterization of causal 
depth. I have shown that this view is close to the view implicit in the practice of great 
scientists such as Darwin and Newton. In contrast to Hume and Humeans, scientific 
realism can advocate such a practice through careful comparisons of relevant theories 
in a specific area of research. Such causal comparisons are necessary for judging if 
the theory in question really does explain the phenomena it purports to explain more 
deeply than the other contenders. In addition, a "causally deep" theory will generally 
lead to further insights that are genuinely novel. 
 
However, it is necessary to sound a note of caution here. Indeed, if one is not careful, 
there is a danger of making scientific realism as a philosophy of science---even when 
it claims to be critical-- as a prioristic and dogmatic as logical empiricism. The 
antidote to such danger is to cultivate a conscious habit of comparing alternative 
theories according to specific criteria for causal depth among other things. Such 
comparisons are never complete or final which is really another way of looking at 
science as an open-ended social process. 
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